A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games by Suijs, J.P.M.
A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games
JEROEN SUIJS1
Abstract
Thispaper extendsthe deﬁnitionof the nucleolusto stochasticcooperativegames,
thatis,tocooperativegameswithrandompayoffstothecoalitions. Itisshownthatthe
nucleolus is nonempty and that it belongs to the core whenever the core is nonempty.
Furthermore, it is shown for a particular class of stochastic cooperative games that
the nucleoluscan be determinedby calculatingthe traditionalnucleolusintroducedby
Schmeidler (1969) of a speciﬁc deterministiccooperative game.
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1 Introduction
In stochastic cooperative games, the payoffs individuals can obtain by cooperating with
each other are random variables instead of deterministic amounts. Moreover, the players
are not allowed to await the realizations of these payoffs before they decide upon an
allocation of these payoffs. These kinds of cooperative games fall outside the scope
of traditional (deterministic) cooperative game theory. Models that can deal with such
situations were introduced by Charnes and Granot (1973) and, more recently, by Suijs,
Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs (1995). The major difference between these two models is
that the ﬁrst model assumes risk neutral behaviour of all the players while the latter model
incorporates risk neutral as well as risk averse and risk loving behaviour of the players.
This paper introduces a nucleolus for the games introduced by Suijs et al. (1995).
The nucleolus, a solution concept for deterministic cooperative games, originates from
Schmeidler (1969). This solution concept yieldsan allocation such that the maximalexcess
of the coalitions is minimized. The excess describes how dissatisﬁed a coalition is with the
proposed allocation. The larger the excess of a particular allocation, the more a coalition
is dissatisﬁed with this allocation. For Schmeidler’s nucleolus the excess is deﬁned as the
difference between the payoff a coalition can obtain when cooperating on its own and the
payoff received by the proposed allocation. So, when less is allocated to a coalition, the
excess of this coalition increases and the other way around.
Since the nucleolus depends mainly on the deﬁnition of the excess, other nucleoli are
found when different deﬁnitions of excesses are used. Such a general approach can be
foundin Potters and Tijs (1992). They introduced the general nucleolus as the solution that
minimizes the maximal excess of the coalitions, using generally deﬁned excess functions.
A similar argument holds for stochastic cooperative games. If we can specify the ex-
cesses we can deﬁne a nucleolus for these games. Unfortunately, this is not that simple.
Deﬁning excess functions for stochastic cooperative games appears to be not as straight-
forward as for deterministic cooperative games. Indeed, how should one quantify the
difference between the random payoff a coalition can achieve on its own and the random
payoff received by the proposed allocation when the behaviour towards risk can differ3
between the members of this coalition? Furthermore,the excess of one coalition should be
comparable to the excess of another coalition.
Charnes and Granot (1976) introduced a nucleolus for cooperative games in stochastic
characteristic function form. There, the excess was based on the probability that the payoff
a coalition can obtain when cooperating on its own, exceeds the payoff they obtained in the
proposed allocation. Indeed, it isquitereasonable to assume that acoalition is less satisﬁed
with the proposed allocation if this probability increases.
For the excess deﬁned in this paper we interpret the excess of Schmeidler’s nucleolus
in a slightly different way. Bearing the conditions of the core in mind, this excess can be
interpreted as follows. Given an allocation of the grand coalition’s payoff we distinguish
two cases. In the ﬁrst case, a coalition wants to leave the grand coalition. Then the excess
equals theminimal amount of money acoalition needs on top of what they already get such
that this coalition is willing to stay in the grand coalition. In the second case, a coalition
has no incentive to leave the grand coalition. Then the excess equals minus the maximal
amount of money that can be taken away from thiscoalition such that thiscoalition still has
no incentiveto leave thegrand coalition. This interpretationis used to deﬁne the excess for
stochastic cooperative games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists mainly of preliminaries. It
brieﬂy recalls the deﬁnition of a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs. Furthermore
it states the assumptions we make on the preferences of the players and it introduces the
necessary deﬁnitions and notations. Then in Section 3 the excess functions are introduced
and, subsequently, a nucleolus. Moreover, it is shown that this nucleolus is a well deﬁned
solution concept in thesense thatit alwaysyieldsanonemptysubset ofallocations. Section
4 showsthat thenucleolusisasubset ofthecorewheneverthecoreisnonempty. Moreover,
it shows that for the class of stochastic cooperative games introduced in Suijs and Borm
(1996) the nucleolus can be determined by calculating Schmeidler’s nucleolus of a speciﬁc
deterministic cooperative game.4
2 Stochastic cooperative games
A stochastic cooperative game is described by a tuple Γ=( N;(XS)SN;(  i)i2N). Here,
the set of players is denoted by N. The payoff a coalition S  N can achieve by
cooperating is denoted by a random variableXS. So, there is a probabilityspace (Ω;H;IP )
such that for each S  N the payoff function XS :Ω!IR is measurable, that is,
X
−1
S (B) 2Hfor each element B of R, the Borel -algebra. Since coalitions are not
allowed to await the realization of XS before they decide on the allocation, the random
payoff XS has to be allocated. An allocation of the random payoffXS among the members
of S is described by a pair (d;r) 2 HS  S,w h e r eH S =f d2IR
S j
P
i 2 S d i  0 g and
S = fr 2 IR
S j8i2S : ri  0;
P
i2S ri =1 g . The random payoff to player i 2 S then
equalsdi+riXS.S o ,rallocatesfractionsoftherandompayoffXS tothemembersofS and
d denotes the transfer payments. Note that these transfer payments need not be efﬁcient.
Moreover, it should be noted that for notational reasons the deﬁnition of an allocation used
in this paper differs from its original deﬁnition in Suijs et al. (1995). Originally, d was
an allocation of the expected payoff E(XS) and r was an allocation of the residual payoff
XS −E(XS). Finally, notethat the random payoffdi+riXS to player i 2 S is measurable
with respect to the probability space (Ω;H;IP ) . Next, deﬁne
L(Γ) = fd + rXSjd 2 IR ;r2[0;1];SNg: (1)
Then L(Γ) is the set of all random payoffsplayeri 2 N can receive in the gameΓ. Finally,
 i are the complete and transitive preferences of player i over the set L(Γ).
Examples of situations where this model may apply appear in insurance. Individuals
facinglossesthatcanoccurtotheminthefuturehavetodecidenowiftheywantaninsurance
fortheselossesornotand,ifso,whichpremiumtheywanttopayforit. Furthermore,groups
of individuals may beneﬁt from taking a collective insurance instead of many individual
ones. Another example appears when considering linear production games with random
prices. Here, a coalition has to decide which goods to produce given the resources they
posses without exactly knowing the revenues that are generated by these goods.5
In the remainder of this paragraph wego through somenecessary preliminaries. There-
fore, consider again the set L(Γ). Denote by FX the distribution function of the random
variable X 2L (Γ). Thus, FX(t)=I P ( f ! j X ( ! )t g )for all t 2 IR . Next, deﬁne
F(Γ) = fFXjX 2L (Γ)g to be the set of distribution functions corresponding to the
random payoffs in L(Γ).N o w , l e t ( F k ) k 2 I Nbe a sequence in F(Γ). Then the sequence
(Fk)k2I N weakly converges to F 2F (Γ), denoted by Fk
w ! F,i flimk!1 Fk(t)=F ( t )
for all t 2f t 02IR j F is continuous in t0g. Subsequently, we say that a sequence (Xk)k2I N
of random variables converges to the random variable X if and only if the corresponding
sequence (Fk)k2I N of probabilitydistributionfunctions weakly converges to the probability






for all F;G 2F (Γ). The following two results can be found in Feller (1950) and Feller
(1966).
Proposition 2.1 Fk
w ! F if and only if limk!1 (Fk;F)=0 .
Proposition 2.2 Let (dk)k2I N and (rk)k2I N be convergent sequences in IR with limits d and
r, respectively. Take X 2L (Γ). Denote by F the distribution function of d + rX and by
Fk the distribution function of dk + rkX for all k 2 IN. Then Fk
w ! F.
This proposition has the following implication which will be frequently used in the
remainder of this paper. Let a subset O F (Γ) be called open if for each F 2 O there
exists ">0such that fG 2F (Γ)j(F;G) <" gO . Furthermore, let (dk)k2I N and
(rk)k2I N be convergent sequences in IR with limits d and r, respectively. Take X 2L (Γ)
and denote by F and Fk the distribution function of d + rX and dk + rkX, respectively.
Next, let O F (Γ) be an open set such that F 2 O. Proposition 2.2 and the deﬁnition of
an open subset then imply that there exists k0 such that Fk 2 O for all k>k 0.6
For the introduction of a nucleolus we focus on cooperative games with stochastic
payoffs Γ=( N;(XS)SN;(  i)i2N) where the preferences of each player satisfy the
following additional conditions:
(C1) continuity, i.e., fFX 2F (Γ)jX  iY g and fFX 2F (Γ)jX  iY g are closed sets in
(F(Γ);)for all Y 2L (Γ), 12
(C2) for any X;Y 2L (Γ) there exist  d;d 2 IR such that X + d i Y i X +  d,
(C3) for all X 2L (Γ) and all d>0we have that X + d i X.
Example 2.3 Let the preferences  i with i 2 (0;1) be such that X  iY if and only
if uX
i := supftjFX(t) < i gu Y
 i := supftjFY(t) < i g ,w h e r eu X
 i denotes the i-
quantile of X. This type of preferences may appear in insurance problems. They are
used by insurance companies if the premium is determined on the basis of the percentile
principle. This type of preferences satisﬁes conditions (C1) - (C3). To see this, note that
udi+riX
i = di+riuX
i. Then, it is clear that  i satisﬁes (C2) and (C3). For continuity,take
Y 2L (Γ). We have to show that the set fX 2L (Γ)jX  iY g is a closed set. Therefore,
let (dk
i + rk
iX)k2I N be a convergent sequence in fX 2L (Γ)jX  iY g and denote its limit
by  X.S o , d k
i+ r k
i u X
 i u Y




i. Since the sequence converges we know from Lemma A.3 in Appendix A that
there exist convergent subsequences (dl
i)l2I N and (rl
i)l2I N with limits di and ri, respectively,
such that di + riX =  X.S i n c e d l
i+ r l




i it follows that
di + riuX
i  uY




1Since the preferences are complete, an equivalent statement is that fFX 2F(Γ)jX i Y g and fFX 2
F(Γ)jX i Y g are open sets in (F(Γ);)for all Y 2L (Γ).
2For ease of notation, the sets fFX 2F (Γ)jX  iY g and fFX 2F (Γ)jX  iY g are often denoted by
fX 2L (Γ)jX  iY g and fX 2L (Γ)jX  iY g, respectively.7
Example 2.4 Let  
bi with bi 2 IR describe the following preferences. For X;Y 2L (Γ)
it holds that X  
biY if E(X)+b i
q
V( X )E ( Y)+b i
q
V( Y) ,w h e r eEdenotes the
expectation and V the variance. This type of preferences can be found for example in
portfoliodecisiontheory,whereanagent’sevaluationofaportfoliodependsontheexpected
revenueoftheportfolioandthestandarddeviationoftherevenue. Thesepreferencessatisfy
conditions (C1) - (C3). To see this, note that
E(di + riX)+b i
q
V( d i+r iX)=d i+r iE ( X )+b ir i
q
V( X)
holds for di 2 IR and ri 2 [0;1]. Then the same arguments as in Example 2.3 can be used
to show that  
bi satisﬁes conditions (C1) - (C3).
Example 2.5 Let  i describe the preferences of an expected utility maximizing player.
So, X  iY if E(ui(X))  E(ui(Y )),w h e r eEdenotes the expectation and ui is the
monotonically increasing utility function of player i. These preferences satisfy conditions
( C 1 )-( C 3 )i ff o ra l lSNeither XS  0 or XS  0. So, the random payoffof a coalition
cannot have both positive and negative realizations. From the fact that ui is increasing
it follows that (C2) and (C3) are satisﬁed. For the continuity condition (C1) we refer to
Lemma A.4 in Appendix A.
In order to deﬁne a nucleolus one needs to specify for each coalition S  N an excess
function ES. The excess function assigns to each allocation (d;r) of the grand coalition
N a real number representing the complaint of coalition S. The larger the complaint of a
coalition the more this coalition is dissatisﬁed with the proposed allocation. For the excess
function introduced in this paper we need the following notation. Deﬁne
IS(Γ) = f(d;r) 2 IR
S  R
S j8i2S : di + riXS  iXfigg;
as the set of possibly nonfeasible individually rational allocations for coalition S. Here, an
allocation (d;r) 2 IS(Γ) is called feasible if
P
i2S di  0. Furthermore, deﬁne




as the set of feasible individually rational allocations for coalition S and




iXS i di + riXSg;
as the set of feasible Pareto optimal allocations for S. Note that assumption (C3) implies
that
P
i2S di =0whenever (d;r) 2 PO S(Γ). Finally, we make another assumption,
namely,
(C4) IS(Γ) 6= ; for all S  N.
Note that this assumption is satisﬁed if Γ is superadditive3. Moreover, it should be noted
that a coalition S is unlikely to be formed when IS(Γ) = ;. Since in that case for every
allocation of XS thereisat least onemember ofS whosepayoffis not individuallyrational.
Hence, he would be better off by leaving coalition S and form a coalition on his own.
Finally, denote by CG(N)the class of all cooperative games with stochastic payoffs with
player set N satisfying conditions (C1) - (C4).
For gaining a clearer insight into the situation and the (forthcoming) mathematics in
particular, we make use of a simpliﬁed graphical representation of the problem. At the
moment this might seem a bit overdone, but for the remainder of this paper these ﬁgures
might turn out to be very helpful. The notions introduced in the preceding paragraph are
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure1representsacooperativegamewithstochasticpayoffswithtwoexpectedutility
maximizing players. The axes represent the utility levels of the players. For simplicity,
we have assumed that payoffs are individually rational if and only if the corresponding
expected utility is greater than or equal to zero. So, the set IS(Γ) is represented by the
positiveorthant. Furthermore,thesetIRS(Γ)ofindividuallyrationalallocationsisdepicted
by the shaded area, and the set PO S(Γ) of Pareto optimal allocations is depicted by the
3Ag a m eΓ=( N;(XS)SN;( i)i2N)is called superadditiveif for all disjunctS;T  N the following
statement is true. For each allocation (dS;r S)of XS and each allocation (dT;r T)of XT there exists an
allocation(d;r)ofXS[T such that di+riXS[T  idS
i +rS
i XS foralli 2 S and di+riXS[T  idT
i +rT
i XS
for all i 2 T. So whatever the allocation of XS and XT are, there is always an allocation of XS[T such that
all members of S [ T are (weakly) better off.9
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FIGURE 1: Individually rational and Pareto optimal allocations in a two-player example.
bold printed curve. Finally, note that this and the forthcoming ﬁgures do not arise from a
concrete example.
In Figure1both IRS(Γ) and PO S(Γ) are compact subsets. The followingpropositions
show that this holds in general for the class CG(N)of cooperative games with stochastic
payoffs.
Proposition 2.6 IRS(Γ) is a compact subset of IS(Γ) for each coalition S  N.
PROOF: See Appendix B.
2
Proposition 2.7 ThesetofParetooptimalallocationsPO S(Γ)isacompactsubset ofIS(Γ)
for each coalition S  N.
PROOF: See Appendix B.
210
Furthermore, we need to consider the following sets. Deﬁne for eachS  N
PD S(Γ) = f(d;r) 2 IS(Γ)j9(d0;r0)2POS(Γ) 8i2S : d0
i + r0
iXS  i di + riXg
as the set of (possibly nonfeasible) allocations that are (weakly) dominated by a Pareto
optimal allocation, and




iXS  i di + riXg
as the set of (possibly nonfeasible) allocations that are not dominated by Pareto optimal
allocations. Note that IRS(Γ)  PD S(Γ). The reverse, however, need not be true, as the
next example shows.
Example 2.8 Consider the following two player example. Let XS be such that −XS is
exponentially distributed with expectation equal to 1 for all S  N. Furthermore let
players 1 and 2 be expected utility maximizers with utility functions u1(t)=− e − 0 : 5 tand
u2(t)=− e − 0 : 25t, respectively. Then E(u1(d1 +r1Xf1;2g)) = −e−d1 1
1−0:5r1 and E(u2(d2 −
r2Xf1;2g)) = −e−d2 1
1−0:25r2. An allocation (d;r) 2 If1;2g(Γ) is individually rational if
E(u1(d1 + r1Xf1;2g)) − 2and E(u2(d2 + r2Xf1;2g)) − 1 : 25. Furthermore, (d;r) is




3 (see Wilson (1968)). Now, consider the
allocation (d;r) with d1 =0 : 1 ,d 2 =0 : 1 ,r 1=1and r2 =0 .S i n c e d 1+ d 2> 0 this
allocation is nonfeasible. However, the Pareto optimal allocation (d;r )with d
1 = −0:9,
d




3 is feasible and preferred by both players. Indeed,
E(u1(d
1 + r






2Xf1;2g)) = −0:9582 > −0:9753 = E(u2(d2 + r2Xf1;2g)):
So even nonfeasible allocations can be Pareto dominated.
Thenextpropositionstatesaveryintuitiveresult. NamelythatforeveryParetodominat-
ed allocation (d;r) and every non-Pareto dominated allocation (d0;r 0), which all members11
of S weakly prefer to the Pareto dominated allocation (d;r), there exists a Pareto optimal
allocationsuch thatforeach player thePareto optimalallocationisweakly betterthan(d;r)
but weakly worse than (d0;r 0).
Proposition 2.9 Let Γ 2 CG(N).T a k e ( d;r) 2 PD S(Γ) and (~ d; ~ r) 2 NPDS(Γ) such
that di + riXS  i ~ di +~ r iX Sfor all i 2 S. Then there exists (^ d; ^ r) 2 PO S(Γ) such that
di + riXS  i ^ di +^ r iX S  i ~ d i+~ r iX S
for all i 2 S.
PROOF: See Appendix B.
2
A direct consequence of this proposition is that for each allocation (d;r) 2 IRS(Γ)
there exists a Pareto optimal allocation (d0;r 0)such that d0
i + r0
iXS  i di + riXS for all
i 2 S. Moreover, since IS(Γ) is nonempty by assumption (C4) we have that for each
(d;r) 2 NPDS(Γ) there exists (d0;r 0)2PO S(Γ) such that d0
i +r0
iXS  i di +riXS for all
i 2 S.
Finally,weintroducethreemoresets. Therefore,let(d;r) 2 IRN(Γ)beanindividually
rational allocation for the grand coalition N.T a k eSNand deﬁne
WS((d;r)) = f(d0;r 0)2IRS(Γ)j8i2S : d0
i + r0
iXS  i di + riXNg
as the set of individually rational allocations for coalitions S which are weakly worse than
the payoff di + riXN for every member of S, and,
BS((d;r)) = f(d0;r 0)2IRS(Γ)j8i2S : d0
i + r0
iXS  i di + riXNg
as the set of individually rational allocations for coalition S which are weakly better than
the payoff di + riXN for every member of S. Furthermore, deﬁne
PO

S((d;r)) = (WS((d;r)) [ BS((d;r))) \ PO S(Γ);
as the set of Pareto optimal allocations for coalition S which are either weakly worse than
di + riXN for all members of S or weakly better than di + riXN for all members of S.




















FIGURE 2: Examples of WS((d;r)), BS((d;r)) and PO
S((d;r)).
3 A nucleolus for stochastic cooperative games
With the deﬁnitions and notions introduced in the previous section we can now deﬁne
an excess function and, consequently, a nucleolus for cooperative games with stochastic
payoffs. The excess functionES : IRN(Γ) ! IR of coaltitionS is deﬁned asfollows. Take











iXS i di + riXN + ig:
For an interpretationof theexcess, let us focuson thecoreconditions. So, givena proposed
allocation (d;r) does a coalition S have an incentive to leave the grand coalition or not.
First, consider again the excess as used in Schmeidler (1969). There, the excess can
be interpeted as the minimum amount of money a coalition needs on top of what they
already receive from the proposed allocation such that they are indifferent between staying
in the grand coalition and leaving the grand coalition. This interpretation is now applied
to stochastic cooperative games. For this, note that given an allocation (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ)
a coalition S is indifferent between staying in the grand coalition N and leaving if there
existsanallocation(d0;r 0)2PO
S((d;r))suchthateachplayeri 2 S isindifferentbetween13
receiving the payoff d0
i + r0
iXS and the payoff di + riXN. So, coalition cannot do strictly
better by leaving the grand coalition but if they do split off they can allocate their payoff in
such a way that no member is strictly worse off.
Now, suppose that a coalition S has an incentive to part company with the grand
coalition N. So, there exists an allocation (~ d; ~ r) 2 IRS(Γ) such that each player i 2 S
strictly prefers the payoff ~ di +~ r iX Sto the payoff di + riXN. To keep this coalition in the
grand coalition the payoff to the members of S must increase. This can be done by giving
each member i 2 S a deterministic amount of money i. Hence, their payoff becomes
di + i + riXN. The excess of coalition S then equals the minimal amount of money they
need so that they are just willing to stay in the grand coalition.
Next, suppose that a coalition S does not have an incentive to split off from the
grand coalition. Hence, this coalition receives more than they can achieve on their own.
Consequently, one can decrease the payoff of each member i 2 S with a deterministic
amount i. Then the excess equals the maximal amount of money that can be taken away
from this coalition such that they are still staying in the grand coalition.
Summarizing, the excess ES((d;r)) represents the minimum amount of money that
coalition S needs in order to be satisﬁed with the allocation (d;r). Moreover, if (d;r) and
(d0;r 0)areallocationsofXN such thateachplayeri 2 S prefersdi+riXN tod0
i+r0
iXN then
ES((d;r)) <E S((d0;r 0)). Hence, the excess decreases when each player i 2 S improves
his payoff. So, in a speciﬁc way the excess ES((d;r)) describes how much coalition S is
satisﬁed withthe allocation(d;r). Finally,since all players’ preferencesare monotonically
increasing in the amount of money d they receive (see assumption (C3)) it is reasonable to
say that one coalition is more satisﬁed with a particular allocation than another coalition if
the ﬁrst coalition needs less money to be satisﬁed than the latter one, or, in other words, if
the excess of the ﬁrst coalition is less than the excess of the latter. This last observation
leads to the following deﬁnition of a nucleolus.







ij8 i 2 S:( d
0;r
0) i  i (d;r)i + ig: (2)14
describe theexcess of coalitionS at allocation(d;r) 2 IRN(Γ). Next, denoteby E((d;r))
the vector of excesses at allocation (d;r) and let E((d;r)) denote the vector of excesses
ordered in a decreasing order. The nucleolus
N(Γ) of the game Γ 2 CG(N)is then deﬁned by
N(Γ) = f(d;r) 2 IRN(Γ)j8(d0;r0)2IRN(Γ) :   E((d;r)) lex   E((d
0;r
0))g; (3)
wherelex isthelexicographicordering. Next, weshowthat thenucleolusisawell deﬁned
solution concept for the games discussed in this paper.
In proving the nonemptiness of the nucleolus N(Γ) we make use of the results stated
in Maschler, Potters and Tijs (1992). They introduced a nucleolus for a more a general
framework and showed that the nucleolus is nonempty if the domain is compact and the
excess functions are continuous. Thus, we have to show that IRN(Γ) is compact and
that ES((d;r)) is continuous in (d;r) for each (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ) and each S  N.T h e
compactness of IRN(Γ) follows immediately from Proposition 2.6. The continuity proof
is a bit more complicated and consists of the following parts.
First we show that PO
S((d;r)) is a nonempty compact subset of PO S(Γ). Then we









iXS i di + riXN + ig:
Hence, ES((d;r)) = minES((d;r)). In the next step we show that ES((d;r)) is a compact
subset of IR for each allocation (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ). This implies that the minimum in
(2) exists. Subsequently, we show that this multifunction is both upper and lower semi
continuous, which then implies that the excess function ES is continuous.
Proposition 3.1 PO
S((d;r)) is a nonempty compact subset of PO S(Γ).
PROOF: That PO
S((d;r)) is compact followsfrom thefacts thatWS((d;r)) andBS((d;r))
are closed by the continuity condition (C1) and PO S(Γ) is compact. To show that it is
nonempty let us distinguish two cases.15
First,letBS((d;r)) 6= ;. Then thereexists(d0;r 0)2IRS(Γ)suchthatd0
i+r0
iXS  idi+
riXS for all i 2 S.S i n c e( d 0;r 0)2IRS(Γ) we know from Proposition 2.9 that there exists
( d;  r) 2 PO S(Γ) such that  di + r iX S  id 0
i+r 0
iX Sfor all i 2 S. Hence, ( d;  r) 2 PO S(Γ)
and ( d; r) 2 BS((d;r)). Consequently, ( d;  r) 2 PO
S((d;r)).
Second, let BS((d;r)) = ;.T a k e(~ d; ~ r) 2 IS(Γ) such that ~ di +~ r iX S id i+r iX Nfor
all i 2 S.F r o m B S ((d;r)) = ; it follows that (~ d; ~ r) 2 NPDS(Γ). Proposition 2.9 then
implies that there exists ( d;  r) 2 PO S(Γ) such that  di + r iX S  i~ d i+~ r iX Sfor all i 2 S.
Hence, ( d;  r) 2 WS((d;r)) and, consequently, ( d; r) 2 PO
S((d;r)).
2







iXS i di + riXN + ig:
Proposition 3.2 Let (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ). Then ES((d;r)) is a compact subset of IR .
P ROOF: We have to show that ES((d;r)) is closed and bounded. That ES((d;r)) is bound-
ed follows from the compactness of PO
S((d;r)) and the fact that for each (d0;r 0) 2
PO
S((d;r)) the number i is uniquely determined by conditions (C1) - (C2). To see
that ES((d;r)) is closed, let (
P
i2S k
i )k2I N be a convergent sequence4 in ES((d;r)) with
limit
P
i2S i. We have to show that
P
i2S i 2E S((d;r)). Therefore, let (( dk;  rk))k2I N
be a sequence in PO
S((d;r)) such that  dk
i + r k
iX S  i d i+ k
i +r iX N for all i 2 S.
SincePO
S((d;r))is compact thereexistsa convergent subsequence(( dl;  rl))l2I N withlimit
( d;  r) 2 PO
S((d;r)).T a k e  i2IR such that  di + r iX S  id i+  i+r iX N for all i 2 S.
Note that
P
i2S  i 2E S((d;r)). The proof is ﬁnished if we can show that i =  i for all
i 2 S. Therefore, let ">0and i 2 S.D e ﬁ n e
V "
i =f Y2L (Γ)j di + r iX S−" iY  i  d i+ r iX S+" g :
4Formally, it would be more correct to start with a convergent sequence (ak)k2N in ES((d;r)).T h e n
a k2E S((d;r)) and the deﬁnition of ES imply that there exist k
i such that di + k
i + riXN i d0
i + r0
iXS




i = ak. Consequently, the sequence (ak)k2I N can be





i is open by the continuity of  i, ( dl;  rl) ! ( d; r) and  di + r iX S 2V"
i there exists
L" 2 IN such that  dl
i + r l
iX S 2V"
i for all l>L ". This implies that di + l
i + riXN 2 V "
i










= di + i + riXN 2\ ">0V
"
i :
Hence, di + i + riXN i  di + r iX S. Since by deﬁnition it holds that  di + r iX S  i
d i+  i+r iX Nit follows by assumption (C3) that i =  i.
2
Lemma 3.3 ES((d;r)) is upper semi continuous in (d;r) for all (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ).
PROOF:L e t((dk;r k))k2I N be a sequence in IRN(Γ) converging to (d;r).T a k e
P
i 2 S k
i 2





i2S i. For upper semi continuity to be
satisﬁed it is sufﬁcient to show that
P
i2S i 2E S((d;r)).
First, take ( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)) such that  dk
i + r k




all i 2 S.S i n c e (( dk;  rk))k2I N is a sequence in the compact set PO S(Γ) there exists a
convergent subsequence (( dl;  rl))l2I N with limit ( d;  r) 2 PO S(Γ). Moreover, it holds that
 di + r iX S id i+ i+r iX N for all i 2 S. To see this, take ">0and i 2 S.D e ﬁ n e
V
"
i =f Y2L (Γ)j di + r iX S−" iY  i  d i+ r iX S+" g :
Since V "
i is open by the continuity of  i, ( dl;  rl) ! ( d; r) and  di + r iX S 2V"
i there exists
L" 2 IN such that  dl
i + r l
iX S 2V"
i for all l>L ". This implies that dl
i + l
i + rl
iXN 2 V "
i












= di + i + riXN i  di + r iX S:
The proof is ﬁnished if we can show that ( d;  r) 2 PO



















iXS  idi + riXN − "g;
PO
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FIGURE 3: A graphical representation of PO"
S ((d;r)) and PO
S((dl;r l)).
We refer to the left ﬁgure of Figure 3 for a graphical interpretation of these sets. Note
that WS((d;r)) = \">0W "




S ((d;r)). Furthermore, deﬁne
V
" = fY 2L (Γ)
Sj8i2S : di + riXN − " i Yi i di + riXN + "g:
Since V " is open by the continuity of  i, (dl;r l) ! (d;r) and (di + riXN)i2S 2 V "
there exists L" 2 IN such that (dl
i + rl
iXN)i2S 2 V " for all l>L " . This implies that
(dl;r l)2W"
S((d;r)) and (dl;r l)2B"
S((d;r)) for all l>L "(see also the right ﬁgure in
Figure 3). Hence, WS((dl;r l))  W "
S((d;r)) and BS((dl;r l))  B"
S((d;r)) for all l>L ".
Consequently, we have for all l>L "that PO
S((dl;r l))  PO"
S ((d;r)). In particular, we
have ( dl;  rl) 2 PO"
S ((d;r)) for all l>L ". Hence,
lim
l!1
( dl;  rl)=( d;  r) 2\ ">0PO"
S ((d;r)) = PO
S((d;r)):
2
Lemma 3.4 ES((d;r)) is lower semi continuous in (d;r) for all (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ).18
PROOF:L e t((dk;r k))k2I N be a sequence converging to (d;r) and let
P
i2S i 2E S((d;r)).













First, note that since IRN(Γ) is compact and ES is upper semi continuous that
ES(IRN(Γ)) = [(d;r)2IRN(Γ)ES((d;r))











i)l2I N converges to
P




i )k2I N converges to
P
i2S i.
Take (  d; r) 2 PO















8i2S : Yi i  di + r iX S−"or




















8i2S : Yi  i  di + r iX S−"or





Note that V " is open and C" is closed by the continuity of  i for each i 2 S.N e x t ,
we show that if (dk
i + rk
i XN)i2S 2 V " then there exists ( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)) such
that ( dk
i + r k
iX S) i 2 S 2V". Therefore, let k 2 IN be such that (dk;r k) 2 V" and let
(~ d; ~ r) 2 IS(Γ) be such that ~ di +~ r iX S  i d k
i +r k
iX N for all i 2 S . We distinguish the
following three cases.
First, suppose that (~ d;~ r) 2 NPDS(Γ).S i n c e ( ~ d i +~ r i X S) i 2 S 2V" it holds that
~ di +~ r iX S  i  d i+ r iX S−"for all i 2 S.F r o m (  d − 1
2 ( ";";:::;"); r) 2 PD S(Γ) and
Proposition 2.9 it follows that there exists ( dk;  rk) 2 PO S(Γ) such that
 di + r iX S− 1




iX S  i ~ d i+~ r iX S
for all i 2 S. Thus, ( dk
i + r k
iX S) i 2 S2V".S i n c e~ d i+~ r iX S id k
i +r k
iX Nfor all i 2 S it
holds that ( dk;  rk) 2 WS((dk;r k)). Hence, ( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)).19
Second, suppose that (~ d;~ r) 2 PD S(Γ) and that ~ di +~ r iX S  i  d i+ r iX S+"for all
i 2 S. Since the Paretooptimalityof( d;  r) implies that ( d+1
2(";";:::;"); r)2NPDS(Γ)
it follows from Proposition 2.9 that there exists ( dk;  rk) 2 PO S(Γ) such that
~ di +~ r iX S  i  d k
i + r k
iX S  i  d i+ r iX S+ 1
2"
for all i 2 S. Thus, ( dk
i + r k
iX S) i 2 S2V".S i n c e~ d i+~ r iX S id k
i +r k
iX Nfor all i 2 S it
holds that ( dk;  rk) 2 BS((dk;r k)). Hence, ( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)).
Finally, suppose that (~ d; ~ r) 2 PD S(Γ) and that ~ di +~ r iX S  i  d i+ r iX S−"for all
i 2 S. Then Proposition 2.9 implies that there exists ( dk;  rk) 2 PO S(Γ) such that





for all i 2 S. Thus, ( dk;  rk) 2 BS((dk;r k)). Therefore we have that ( dk;  rk) 2
PO
S((dk;r k)). Moreover, ( dk
i + r k
iX S) i 2 S2V".
Now we are able to construct a sequence (
P
i2S k





for each k 2 IN such that each convergent subsequence converges to
P
i2S i.
Let ("m)m2I N be a strictly decreasing sequence such that "m > 0 for all m 2 IN
and limm!1 "m =0 . Hence, (V "m)m2I N is a decreasing sequence in the sense that
V "m  V "m0
if m>m 0.D e ﬁ n eV 0=\ ">0V ".F r o m(  d;  r) 2 PO
S((d;r)) it follows that
(di +riXN)i2S 2 V 0. Hence, (di +riXN)i2S 2 V " for all ">0 .S i n c e( d k;r k)converges
to (d;r) there exists K1 2 IN such that for all k>K 1it holds that (dk
i + rk
iXS)i2S 2 V "1.
Next, take k 2 IN.I f kK 1then take
P
i2S k
i 2E S((dk;r k)) arbitrary. If k>K 1we
distinguish the following two cases.
In the ﬁrst case, suppose that (dk
i + rk
i XN)i2S 2 V 0. Then ( d; r) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)) and
( di + r iX S) i 2 S2V0. So, we can take ( dk;  rk) equal to ( d; r) (See the left ﬁgure of Figure
4) .
In the second case, let (dk
i + rk
i XN)i2S 62 V 0. Then there exists m(k) 2 IN such that
(dk
i + rk
iXN)i2S 2 V "m(k)nV "m(k)+1. Subsequently, take ( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)) such
that ( dk
i + r k
iX S) i 2 S 2V" m ( k ) (See the right ﬁgure of Figure 4, where the bold printed
curve represents the set of allocations that belong to both PO







(d ,r  )
(d ,r  )=(d ,r ) (d ,r )






















FIGURE 4: The choice of the allocation (dk;r k)for the two different cases.





i XN for all i 2 S. Then either (d0;r 0)2PD S(Γ) or (d0;r 0)2NPDS(Γ).
For the case that (d0;r 0)2PD S(Γ) then (dk
i + rk
i XN)i2S 2 V "m(k) implies that (d0
i +
r0
iXS)i2S 2 V "m(k) and, consequently, that
d0
i + r0
iXS  i  di + r iX S−" m ( k )





iXS  i  di + r iX S+"
m ( k )
for all i 2 S. If the ﬁrst statement is true then it follows from Proposition 2.9 that there
exists ( dk;  rk) 2 PO S(Γ) such that  dk
i + r k
iX S  id 0
i+r 0
iX Sfor all i 2 S. This implies that
( dk
i + rk
iX S) i2S 2V"m(k) and( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)). Ifthesecond statement istruethen














iX S  i  d i+ r iX S+"
m ( k )
for all i 2 S. Hence, ( dk;  rk) 2 PO
S((dk;r k)) and ( dk
i + r k
iX S) i 2 S2V" m ( k ).21
For the case that (d0;r 0)2NPDS(Γ) a similar argument holds.
Next, let k
i be such that  dk
i + r k
iX S  id k
i +r k
iX N+ k




i 2E S((dk;r k))and( dk
i + rk
iX S) i2S 2V0if(dk
i +rk
iXN)i2S 2 V 0
and( dk
i + r k
iX S) i2S 2V" m(k) if (dk
i +rk
iXN)i2S 62 V 0.S i n c e(
P
i 2 S k
i) k 2 I Nisasequence in
the compact set ES(IRS(Γ)) there exists a convergent subsequence (
P
i2S l
i)l2I N with limit
P
i2S ~ i. Corresponding to this convergent subsequence there is a sequence( dl
i + r l
iX S) l 2 I N
such that ( dl
i + r l
iX S) i 2 S 2V0 if (dl
i + rl
iXN)i2S 2 V 0 and ( dl
i + r l
iX S) i 2 S 2V" m ( l )
if (dl
i + rl
iXN)i2S 62 V 0. Moreover, it holds that  dl
i + r l




all i 2 S. This implies that (dl
i + rl
iXN + l
i)i2S 2 V 0 if (dl
i + rl




i)i2S 2 V "m(l) if (dl
i + rl







i)i2S =( d i+ r i X N+ ~  i ) i 2 S 2 V 0 :
Thisimpliesthatdi+riXN+~ i i  di+ riXSforalli 2 S.S i n c e d i+ riXS i di+riXN+i













So, each convergent subsequence (
P
i2S l
i)l2I N converges to
P






i2S i, which completes the proof.
2
Proposition 3.5 The excess function ES((d;r)) is continuous in (d;r) for each (d;r) 2
IRS(Γ).
PROOF:L e t ((dk;r k))k2I N be a sequence in IRN(Γ) converging to (d;r) 2 IRN(Γ).
We have to show that limk!1 ES((dk;r k)) = ES((d;r)).S i n c e( E S((dk;r k)))k2I N is a se-
quence in the compact set ES(IRN(Γ)) there exists a convergent subsequence
(ES((dl;r l)))l2I N with limit . Note that the upper semi continuity of ES implies that22







i 2E S((dl;r l)) for all l 2 IN and liml!1
P
i2S l
i = ES((d;r)). Then




  = liml!1 ES((dl;r l)):
Hence, liml!1
P
i2S ES((dl;r l)) = ES((d;r)). Thus, every convergent subsequence of
(ES((dk;r k)))k2I N converges to ES((d;r)). The compactness of ES(IRN(Γ)) then implies
that limk!1 ES((dk;r k)) = ES((d;r)).
2
Summarizing, it is shown that the domain IRN(Γ) is compact and that the excess
function ES is continuous for each coalition S  N. From the results stated in Maschler
et al. (1992) it then follows that the nucleolus N(Γ) as deﬁned in (3) is a nonempty subset
of IRN(Γ) for each stochastic cooperative game Γ 2 CG(N).
4 The nucleolus, the core and deterministic equivalents
For deterministiccooperativegamesit isknown that the nucleolusas deﬁned inSchmeidler
(1969) is a core allocation whenever the core is nonempty. A similar result can be derived
for the nucleolus N(Γ) introduced in this paper. For this, recall that an allocation (d;r) 2
IRN(Γ) is a core allocation for the game Γ if for each coalition S  N there exists no
allocation ( d;  r) 2 IRS(Γ) such that  di + r iX S id i+r iX Nfor all i 2 S.T h es e to fa l l
core allocations is denoted by Core(Γ).
Theorem 4.1 Let Γ 2 CG(N).I fCore(Γ) 6= ; then N(Γ)  Core(Γ).
PROOF:T a k e( d;r) 2 IRN(Γ)andS  N.L e t(~ d S;~ r S)2I S(Γ)besuchthat ~ dS
i +~ rS
i XS i
di +riXN for all i 2 S. Moreover, let ( d;  r) 2 PO
S((d;r)) and  2 IR
S be such that
 di + r iX S  id i+r iX N+ ifor all i 2 S and
P
i2S i = ES((d;r)). Regarding the sign
of the excess, we distinguish three cases.23
First, suppose (~ dS; ~ rS) 2 PD S(Γ)nPO S(Γ). Then  di + r iX S   i~ d S
i +~ r S
iX S for all
i 2 S. Hence, i  0 for all i 2 S.S i n c e ( ~ d S ; ~ r S ) is not Pareto optimal there exists
j 2 S such that  dj + r jX S j ~ d S
j +~ r S
jX S  jd j+r jX N. Then j > 0 and, consequently,
ES((d;r)) =
P
i2S i > 0.
Second, suppose (~ dS; ~ rS) 2 PO S(Γ). This implies that 0 2E S ((d;r)). Hence,
ES((d;r))  0.
Third, suppose (~ dS; ~ rS) 2 NPDS(Γ)nPO S(Γ). Then  di + r iX S   i~ d S
i +~ r S
iX S for
all i 2 S. Hence, i  0 for all i 2 S. Moreover, since (~ dS; ~ rS) is not Pareto optimal
there exists j 2 S such that  dj + r jX S  j ~ d S
i +~ r S
jX S  j d j+r jX N.S o ,  j< 0 and,
consequently, ES((d;r)) =
P
i2S i < 0.
Now we show that the excess vector corresponding to a core allocation is lexicograph-
ically smaller then the excess vector corresponding to an allocation that does not belong to
the core. This implies that the latter allocation cannot belong to the nucleolus of the game
whenever core allocations exist. Hence, the nucleolus must be a subset of the core.
Take (d;r) 2 Core(Γ) and (d0;r 0)62 Core(Γ).S i n c e( d;r) 2 Core(Γ) it followsfrom
the core conditions that (~ dS; ~ rS) 2 NPDS(Γ) for all S  N. Hence, ES((d;r))  0
for all S  N.S i n c e ( d 0 ;r 0) 62 Core(Γ) there exists a coalition S  N and an allo-
cation (^ d; ^ r) 2 IRS(Γ) for S such that ^ di +^ r iX S  i d 0
i+r 0
iX N for all i 2 S. Hence,
(~ d0S; ~ r0S) 2 PD S(Γ)nPO S(Γ) and, consequently, ES((d0;r 0)) > 0. This implies that
  ES((d;r)) <lex   ES((d0;r 0)). Thus (d0;r 0)62 N(Γ).
2
Next, consider the class MG(N) of cooperative games with stochastic payoffs intro-
duced in Suijs and Borm (1996). For this particular class of games it was shown that the
core of a game Γ=( N;(XS)SN;(  i)i2N) is nonempty if and only if the core of a
corresponding deterministic game Γ =( N;(xS)SN;(  i)i2N) is nonempty. This de-
terministic game Γ is called the deterministic equivalent of Γ. The preferences  i of a
game Γ 2 MG(N)are such that there exists a function mi : L1(I R) ! IR satisfying
(M1) for all X 2 L1(I R) : X i mi(X),
(M2) for all X;Y 2 L1(I R) : X  iY if and only if mi(X)  mi(Y ),24
(M3) for all d 2 IR : m i( d )=d ,
(M4) for all X 2 L1(I R) and all d 2 IR : m i( X + d )=d+m i( X ) ,
with L1(I R) the set of all random variables with ﬁnite expectation. Here, mi(X) represents
the deterministic equivalent of the random payoff X according to player i. So, player i is
indifferent between receiving the random payoff X and receiving the amount mi(X) with
certainty. Furthermore,the payoff xS of coalition S in the game Γ is deﬁned by





for all S  N. Moreover, Suijs and Borm (1996) also showed that an allocation (d;r) 2
IRS(Γ)is Paretooptimal ifand only ifforthecorrespondingallocation (mi(di+riXS))i2S
in Γ it holds that
P
i2S mi(di + riXS)=x S. Finally, note that  i satisﬁes conditions
(C2) and (C3) foralli 2 N and that thepreferencesdiscussed in Example2.3 and Example
2.4 satisfy (M1) - (M4). Moreover, if the utility functions discussed in Example 2.5 are
exponential then conditions (M1) - (M4) are also satisﬁed.
In the remainder of this section we show that the nucleolusN(Γ) of the deterministic
equivalent coincides with the nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969). Moreover, we
show that an allocation (d;r) 2 IRN(G)belongs to the nucleolus N(Γ) if and only if the
corresponding allocation (mi(di + riXN))i2N in the deterministic equivalent Γ belongs
to the nucleolus N(Γ) of Γ.
Let Γ 2 CG(N)be such that conditions (M1)-(M4) are satisﬁed. For the deterministic
equivalent Γ of Γ it holds that
IS(Γ)=f y2IR
S j8i2S : yi  xfigg





is the set of feasible individually rational allocations for S and
PO S(Γ)=f y2IRS(Γ)j69 y 02 IRS(Γ)8i2S : y
0
i >y ig ;25
is the set of Pareto optimal allocations of S. Obviously, IRS(Γ) and PO S(Γ) are
compact. Next, note that for each allocation y 2 IRN(Γ) and each S  N we have that
WS(y)=f y 0 2 IRS(Γ)j8i2S : y0
i  yig;




S(y)=( W S ( y ) [ B S ( y )) \ PO S(Γ):
So PO
S(y)is the set of Pareto optimal allocations for S such that all members of S prefer
the allocation y to such a Pareto optimal allocation or all members of S prefer the Pareto
optimal allocation to y. The excess function ES : IRN(Γ) ! IR can now be rewritten as








i = yi + ig:




i = xS it followsthat ES(y)=x S−
P
i 2 Sy i. Hence, N(G)
coincides with the traditional nucleolus for the game Γ.











iXS i di + riXN + ig
=m i n









iXS)=m i( d i+r iX N+ i) g
=m i n









iXS)= i+m i( d i+r iX N) g
=m i n












mi(di + riXN)=E S ((mi(di + riXN))i2N):
So, theexcess of coalitionS at allocation(d;r) equals theexcess introduced bySchmeidler
(1969)ofcoalitionSatthecorrespondingallocation(mi(di+riXN))i2N inthedeterministic
equivalent Γ. Moreover, for each allocation (d;r) 2 PO N(Γ) in Γ the vector (mi(di +
riXN))i2N is an allocation of xN in Γ and, vice versa, for each allocation y of xN in
Γ there exists an allocation (d;r) 2 PO N(Γ) in Γ such that mi(di + riXN)=y ifor all
i 2 N. This result has the following three implications.
First, since the deterministic equivalent of a deterministic cooperative game is the de-
terministicgameitself it followsthat thenucleolusN coincideswith Scmeidler’snucleolus
on the class of deterministic cooperative games.26
Second, an allocation (d;r) belongs to the nucleolus N(Γ) of the game Γ if and only if
the corresponding allocation (mi(di + riXN))i2N belongs to the nucleolus N(Γ) of the
corresponding deterministic equivalent Γ.
Third, the nucleolus N(Γ) is nonempty if IRN(Γ) 6= ;. Hence, for all games
Γ 2 MG(N) the nucleolus N(Γ) is nonempty if IRN(Γ) 6= ;. This is in particular
interesting since Suijs and Borm (1996) also showed that the relation between stochastic
cooperative games Γ 2 MG(N) and their deterministic equivalents Γ also holds if the
followingmoregeneraldeﬁnitionofanallocationisused. Insteadofapair(d;r) 2 HSS
an allocation oftherandom payoffXS isdescribed by apair(d;Y ) 2 HS L1(I R)S,w h e r e
Y is an S-dimensional vector of random variables such that
P
i2S Yi = XS. Furthermore,
note that the preferences discussed in Example 2.3, Example 2.4 and Example 2.5 are
not continuous on the set L1(I R) of all random variables with ﬁnite expectation. Hence,
condition(C1)isnotsatisﬁed incase thisdeﬁnitionofan allocationisused. Forastochastic
cooperative game Γ 2 MG(N), however, the nucleolus still exists.
Example 4.2 Consider the following three player game Γ.L e t − X f i g Exp(1) for
i =1 ;2 ;3and let XS =
P
i2S Xfig if jSj2 . So, each player individually faces a random
cost which is exponentially distributed with expectation equal to 1. The cost of a coalition
then equals the sum of the cost of the members of this coalition. Furthermore, all players
are expected utility maximizers with utility functions u1(t)=− e − 0 : 5 t ,u 2 ( t )=− e − 0 : 33t
and u3(t)=− e − 0 : 25t, respectively. For the deterministic equivalent mi it holds that
mi(di + riXS)=u − 1
i ( E ( u i ( d i+ r i X S ))). For the deterministic equivalent Γ of Γ
we then get xf1g = −1:3863, xf2g = −1:2164, xf3g = −1:1507, xf1;2g = −2:2314,
xf1;3g = −2:1878, xf2;3g = −2:1582 and xf1;2;3g = −3:1800. The nucleolus N(Γ) of
this game is equal to (−1:0933;−1:0633;−1:0234). To determine the nucleolus N(Γ)
note that an allocation (d;r) is Pareto optimal if and only if r =1
9(2;3;4). Then the only
allocation (d;r) for which (mi(di + riXN))i2N = N(Γ) is the allocation (d;r )with
d =( − 0 : 3865;−0:0034;0:3899) and r = 1
9(2;3;4). Hence, N(Γ) = f(d;r )g.27
Appendix A
For the following lemma stated in this appendix we use the following notation. Let
X;Y 2L (Γ) and let (dk)k2I N and (rk)k2I N be sequences in IR and [0;1], respectively.
Denote by F, F k and G the probability distribution functions of X, dk + rkX and Y ,
respectively. Moreover, note that
F
k(t)=I P ( f ! j d
k+r
kX( ! )t g )=I P ( f ! j X ( ! ) t −  k
r k g )=F( t − d k
r k ) ;
if rk 6=0 .
Lemma A.3 If F k w ! G then there exists d 2 IR and r 2 [0;1] such that Y = d + rX.
PROOF: First, since (rk)k2I N is a sequence in [0;1] we may assume without loss of gen-
erality that (rk)k2I N converges to r 2 [0;1]. Second, note that F k w ! G implies that
limk!1 F k(t)=G ( t )for all t 2 CG = ft 2 IR j G is continuous in tg. Note that IR n C G is
a countable set.
Consider the following two cases.
I: r =0 . InthiscasewehavethatY isadegeneraterandomvariable,i.e,IP ( f ! j Y ( ! )=
d g )=1for some d 2 IR . Hence, F k w ! G implies that limk!1 dk = d.
II: r>0 . In this case we show that limk!1 dk = d for some d 2 IR . Suppose that the
sequence (dk)k2I N does not converge. Then there are three possibilities.
First, it holds that limk!1 dk =+ 1 . Then limk!1 F k(t) = limk!1 F(
t−dk
rk )=0
for all t 2 CG. Consequently, it must hold that G(t)=0for all t 2 CG. Clearly, this
is a contradiction.
Second,itholdsthatlimk!1 dk = −1. Thenlimk!1 F k(t) = limk!1 F( t−dk
rk )=1
for all t 2 CG. Consequently, it must be true that G(t)=1for all t 2 CG. Again,
this is a contradiction.
Third, there exist convergent subsequences (dl)l2I N and (dm)m2I N with limits d and
 d, respectively, such that d> d .L e t t 12 C G .S i n c e limk!1 F k(t1)=G ( t 1 )28
it follows that liml!1 F l(t1) = liml!1F(
t1−dl
rl )=G ( t 1 )and limm!1 F m(t1)=
limm!1 F(
t1−dm
rm )=G ( t 1 ) .S o , liml!1 F(
t1−dl
rl ) = limm!1 F(
t1−dm
rm ).F r o m t h e
fact that probability distribution functions are nondecreasing and continuous from




r ). To be moreprecisely,
F(t) = liml!1 F(
t1−dl




r ). This impliesthat G is constant on the
interval[t1;t 1+d− d). Toseethis,take 2 [t1;t 1+d− d).I fGiscontinuousin then
it follows from F k w ! G that G() = liml!1F(
−dl
rl ) = limm!1 F(
−dm











r ) it holds that G() = liml!1 F(
t1−dl
rl ).
If G is not continuous in  then there exists 1; 2 2 C G such that t1  1 <
< 2<t 1+ d − d . Hence, by the same argument as above we have that
G(1)=G (  2) = liml!1 F(
t1−dl
rl ).S i n c eGis nondecreasing it holds that G(1) 
G()  G(2). Thus G() = liml!1 F(
t1−dl
rl ). Consequently, G is constant on the
interval [t1;t 1+d−  d).
Next, take t 2 [t1;t 1+d−  d). By the same argument as above it follows that F is
constant on [ t−d
r ; t− d
r ) and that G is constant on [t;t+d−  d). Hence, G is constant on
the interval [t1;t 1+2 ( d− d )). Repeating this argument yields that G is constant on
(t1;1). Finally, since this holds for all t1 2 CG it follows that G is constant on IR .
Obviously, this is a contradiction.
Next,letFddenotetheprobabilitydistributionfunctionofd+rX.S i n c elimk!1 dk = d
and limk!1 rk = r it follows that F k w ! Fd. Hence, Fd(t)=G ( t )for all t 2 CG.S i n c e
F dand G are continuous from the right it follows that Fd(t)=G ( t )for all t 2 IR . Conse-
quently, Y = d + rX.
2
Lemma A.4 Thepreferencerelation  iarisingfromanexpectedutilitymaximizingplayer
satisﬁes the continuity condition (C1).
PROOF:L e tXbe random variable and let (dk
i + rk
iX)k2I N be a convergent sequence with
limit  X. From Lemma A.3 we know that there exists di and ri such that limk!1 dk
i = di,29
limk!1 rk






iX)) does not converge to E(ui(di +riX)). Then there are
three posssibilities
(i) there exists ">0and K" 2 IN such that E(ui(dk
i + rk
i X)) <E ( u i( d i+r iX )) − "
for all k  K",
(ii) there exists ">0and K" 2 IN such that E(ui(dk
i + rk
i X)) >E ( u i( d i+r iX )) + "
for all k  K".
(iii) there exists subsequences (E(ui(dm
i + rm





i X)) <E ( u i( d i+r iX ))−" forsome">0and allm>M "
or E(ui(dl
i + rl
iX)) >E ( u i( d i+r iX )) + " for some ">0and all l>L "or both.
In the ﬁrst case, deﬁne  dk
i =i n f l  kd k
i and  rk
i =i n f l  kr k
i if X  0 and  rk
i =s u p l  kr k
i
if X  0 for all k 2 IN. Then ( dk
i + r k
iX ( ! ))k2I N is an increasing sequence with limit
d + rX(!) for all ! 2 Ω. Moreover,  dk
i + r k
iX ( ! )d k
i +r k
iX ( ! )for all k 2 IN and all
! 2 Ω. Hence, E(ui( dk
i + r k
iX ))  E(ui(dk
i + rk
i X)) for all k 2 IN. Next, let V  IR be





















i t ) dF(t)


  < 1
4";




V c ui(di + rit)dF(t) −
Z










Vcu i( d i+r it ) dF(t) −
Z











i)k2I N and ( rk




V c ui(di + rit)dF(t) −
Z




it ) dF(t) < 1
2";30











it ) dF(t) < 1
2";








i + r k
it ) dF(t) <" ;
for all k  L". This implies that
Z 1
−1























ui(di + rit)dF(t) − "
for all k  L".
For the second case, one can derive a contradiction in a similar way as for the ﬁrst
case. Finally, in the third case a contradiction can be derived by applying the argument of






PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.6: Since IRS(Γ)  IS(Γ)  IR
S  IR
S it is sufﬁcient to prove
that IRS(Γ) is closed and bounded in IR
S  IR
S .S i n c e




and IS(Γ) is closed by the continuity of  i for all i 2 S it follows that IRS(Γ) is closed.
To see that IRS(Γ) is bounded, deﬁne for each i 2 S and each ri 2 [0;1]
di(ri)=m i n f d ij d i+r iX S  iX f i gg :
Note that di(ri) exists by assumptions (C1) and (C2) and that di(ri)+r iX S  i X f i g.T o
showthatminri2[0;1]di(ri)existsitsufﬁcestoshowthatdi(ri)iscontinuousinri. Therefore,
consider the sequence (rk
i )k2I N with rk
i 2 [0;1] and limk!1 rk
i = ri. By deﬁnition we have
for all k 2 IN that di(rk
i )+r k
iX S  iX f i g. Hence, di(rk
i )+r k
iX S  id i( r i)+r iX S for all













i )+r iX S  id i( r i)+r iX S
Then assumption (C3) implies that limk!1 di(rk
i )=d i( r i) . Consequently, di(ri) is con-
tinuous in ri and
di =m i n
r i 2 [0;1]
di(ri)
exists and is ﬁnite for all i 2 S.
Since(d;r) 2 IRS(Γ)impliesthatdi+riXS  iXfig foralli 2 S itfollowsbycondition
(C3) that di  di for all i 2 S. Hence, (d;r) 2 IRS(Γ) implies that
d 2f~ d2IR
S j8i2S : ~ di  di;
X
i2S
~ di  0g
and r 2 S. Since both sets are bounded, we have that IRS(Γ) is bounded.
2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.7: Since PO S(Γ)  IRS(Γ) and IRS(Γ) is compact it is suf-
ﬁcient to show that PO S(Γ) is closed in IRS(Γ).L e t ( d;r) 2 IRS(Γ) be such that
(d;r) 62 PO S(Γ). Then there exists ( d;  r) 2 IRS(Γ) such that  di + r iX S  i d i+r iX S32
for all i 2 S. Next, consider the set f(d0;r 0) 2 IRS(Γ)jd0
i + r0
iXS i  di + r iX Sg .B y
the continuity of  i this set is open in IRS(Γ). Indeed, by the continuity of  i we have
that fY 2L (Γ)Sj9i2S : Yi  i di + r iX Sgis closed. Hence, Proposition 2.6 implies that
f(d0;r 0) 2 IRS(Γ)j9i2S : d0
i + r0
iXS  i di + r iX Sgis closed in IS(Γ). Hence, it is also
closed in IRS(Γ). Consequently, f(d0;r 0)2IRS(Γ)j8i2S : d0
i +r0
iXS i  di + r iX Sgmust
beopen inIRS(Γ).S i n c e( d;r) belongstothelatterset thereexistsan open neighbourhood
O of (d;r) in IRS(Γ) such that O f ( d 0;r 0)2IRS(Γ)j8i2S : d0
i + r0
iXS i  di + r iX Sg .
This implies that (~ d; ~ r) 62 PO S(Γ) whenever (~ d; ~ r) 2 O. Hence, IRS(Γ)nPO S(Γ) is open
in IRS(Γ) and, consequently, PO S(Γ) is closed in IRS(Γ).
2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.9: Let (d;r) 2 PD S(Γ) and (~ d; ~ r) 2 NPDS(Γ). Without
loss of generality we may assume that (d;r) 2 IRS(Γ).5 Take i 2 IR be such that
di + i + riXS i ~ di +~ r iX S. Note that i  0 by condition (C3). Next, take  r 2 S
and t 2 [0;1].L e t d i ( r;t) be such that  di( r;t)+ r iX S  i d i+ti + riXS. Note that the
allocation( d( r;t); r)isfeasible ifand onlyif
P
i2S  di( r;t)  0. First, we showthat  di( r;t)
is continuous in ( r;t).
Let (( rk;t k))k2I N be a convergent sequence with limit ( r;t). We have to show that
limk!1  di( rk;t k)= d i( r;t). Notethat  di( rk;t k)+ rk




i =f Y 2L (Γ)jdi + ti + riXS −" i Y i di + ti + riXS + "g:
Since tk ! t there exists K" 2 IN such that di + tki + riXS 2 V "
i for all k>K " .
Consequently, we have that  di( rk;t k)+ r k
iX S 2V"
i for all k>K " . This implies that
limk!1



















k)+ r iX S  id i+ti + riXS:
Since  di( r;t)+ riXS i di+ti+riXS itfollowsfromcondition(C3)thatlimk!1  di( rk;t k)=
 d i( r;t).
5If (d;r) 62 IRS(Γ) then there exists (d0;r 0)2IRS(Γ) such that d0
i + r0
iXS i di + riXS for all i 2 S.
If 0
i < 0 is such that d0
i+0
i +r0
iXS i di +riXS forall i 2 S then (d0 +0;r 0)is stilla feasibleallocation.
Thus, (d0 + 0;r 0)2IRS(Γ). Continuingthe proofwith theallocation (d;r) replaced by (d0 +0;r 0)would
yould the same result.33
Next, deﬁne f(t)=m i n  r 2  S
P
i 2 S d i ( r;t) for all t 2 [0;1]. Then f is a continuous
function. Moreover, since (d;r) 2 IRS(Γ) and  di(r;0) = di for all i 2 S it follows
from the feasibility of (d;r) that f(0) 
P
i2S  di(r;0) =
P
i2S di  0. Furthermore,
since di + i + riXS i ~ di +~ r iX S for all i 2 S and (~ d;~ r) 2 NPDS(Γ) it follows that
(d + ;r) 2 NPDS(Γ). This implies that f(1)  0. For, if f(1) < 0 then there exists
r 2 S such that
P
i2S  di(r;1) < 0 and  di(r;1)+r
iXS i di +i +riXS for all i 2 S.
Consequently, the allocation yielding the payoffs




 di(r;1) + r
iXS
for each i 2 S is feasible and preferredto di +i +riXS by all players i 2 S. Clearly, this
contradicts the fact that (d + ;r) 2 NPDS(Γ). Thus, f(0)  0  f(1). The continuity
of f then implies that there exists ^ t such that f(^ t)=0 .
Let ^ r 2 S be such that
P
i2S  di(^ r;^ t)=0 . Then the allocation ( d(^ r;^ t);^ r) is Pareto
optimal. To see this, ﬁrst note that
P
i2S  di( r;^ t)  0 for all  r 2 S. Second, note that the
deﬁnition of  di( r;t) implies that
 di(^ r;^ t)+^ r iX S  i  d i( r;^ t)+ r iX S (4)
for all i 2 S and all  r 2 S. Next, take  r 2 S.I f
P
i 2 S d i ( r;^ t) > 0 then the allocation
( d( r;^ t); r) is not feasible. From expression (4) it then follows that there exists no feasible
allocation ( d;  r) which all players i 2 S prefer to the allocation ( d(^ r;^ t);^ r).
If
P
i2S  di( r;^ t)=0then the allocation ( d( r;^ t); r) is feasible. Moreover, an allocation
( d;  r) that all players i 2 S prefer to ( d( r;^ t); r) must be infeasible by condition (C3) and
expression (4). Hence, there exists no feasible allocation ( d; r) which all players i 2 S
prefer to ( d(^ r;^ t);^ r). Consequently, ( d(^ r;^ t);^ r) is Pareto optimal. 0  ^ t  1 then implies
that
di + riXS  i  di(^ r;^ t)+^ r iX S  id i+ i+r iX S  i ~ d i+~ r iX S
for all i 2 S.
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